:: commit 0af926939b693551973939ab01d7489af521b180

Mintsuki <mintsuki@protonmail.com> — 2025-03-11 22:31

parents: a3bb9a3597

docs: FAQ.md: Ensure it fits within 80-cols

diff --git a/FAQ.md b/FAQ.md
index e6ff8d77..41436039 100644
--- a/FAQ.md
+++ b/FAQ.md
@@ -2,26 +2,35 @@
 
 ### Why not support filesystem X or feature Y? (eg: LUKS, LVM)
 
-The idea with Limine is to remove the responsibility of parsing filesystems and formats, aside from the bare minimum necessities (eg: FAT*, ISO9660),
-from the bootloader itself.
-It is a needless duplication of efforts to have bootloaders support all possible filesystems and formats, and it leads to massive, bloated
+The idea with Limine is to remove the responsibility of parsing filesystems and
+formats, aside from the bare minimum necessities (eg: FAT*, ISO9660), from the
+bootloader itself. It is a needless duplication of efforts to have bootloaders
+support all possible filesystems and formats, and it leads to massive, bloated
 bootloaders as a result (eg: GRUB2).
-What is needed is to simply make sure the bootloader is capable of reading its own files, configuration, and be able to load kernel/module files
-from disk. The kernel should be responsible for parsing everything else as it sees fit.
+
+What is needed is to simply make sure the bootloader is capable of reading its
+own files, configuration, and be able to load kernel/module files from disk.
+The kernel should be responsible for parsing everything else as it sees fit.
 
 ### What about LUKS? What about security? Encrypt the kernel!
 
-Simply put, this is unnecessary. Putting the kernel/modules in a readable FAT32 partition and letting Limine know about their BLAKE2B checksums
-in the config file provides as much security as encrypting the kernel does.
+Simply put, this is unnecessary. Putting the kernel/modules in a readable FAT32
+partition and letting Limine know about their BLAKE2B checksums in the config
+file provides as much security as encrypting the kernel does.
 
-### What? But what if someone modifies the config file! Ha! You clearly have not thought about that!
+### What? But what if someone modifies the config file! Ha! You clearly have
+### not thought about that!
 
-We have. While this is a pointless effort on legacy x86 BIOS, it is a reasonable expectation on UEFI systems with Secure Boot. Limine provides a
-way to modify its own EFI executable to bake in the BLAKE2B checksum of the config file itself. The EFI executable can then get signed with
-a key added to the firmware's keychain. This prevents modifications to the config file (and in turn the checksums contained there)
-from going unnoticed.
+We have. While this is a pointless effort on legacy x86 BIOS, it is a
+reasonable expectation on UEFI systems with Secure Boot. Limine provides a way
+to modify its own EFI executable to bake in the BLAKE2B checksum of the config
+file itself. The EFI executable can then get signed with a key added to the
+firmware's keychain. This prevents modifications to the config file (and in
+turn the checksums contained there) from going unnoticed.
 
-### But I don't want to have a separate FAT boot partition! I don't want it!!!
+### But I don't want to have a separate FAT boot partition! I don't want it!
 
-Well tough luck. It is `$year_following_2012` now and most PCs are equipped with UEFI and simply won't boot without a FAT EFI system partition
-anyways. It is not unreasonable to share the EFI system partition with the OS's /boot and store kernels and initramfses there.
+Well tough luck. It is `$year_following_2012` now and most PCs are equipped
+with UEFI and simply won't boot without a FAT EFI system partition anyways.
+It is not unreasonable to share the EFI system partition with the OS's /boot
+and store kernels and initramfses there.
tab: 248 wrap: offon